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_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Plaintiff James Cibula brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several 
employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole.  He alleges defendants violated his 
procedural due process rights by classifying him as a sex offender without a prior 
hearing, violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment by subjecting him to abuse and harassment based on this improperly imposed 
sex offender status, and collectively conspired to violate these constitutional rights.  He 
appeals the District Court’s order granting defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss 
on the grounds that his claims were not filed within the two-year statute of limitations for 
§ 1983 claims arising in Pennsylvania.  We will affirm.
1
 
I. 
 Cibula’s claims arise from his incarceration in a Pennsylvania state prison after 
pleading nolo contendere to two counts of making terroristic threats in the Northampton 
County Court of Common Pleas on February 5, 2007.  After successfully appealing his 
initial sentence of five to ten years, he was resentenced to consecutive terms of six 
months to five years on December 21, 2007.  One week later, he was transferred to State 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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Correctional Institution Mercer (“Mercer”) from Northampton County Jail, where he had 
been imprisoned since February 6, 2006. 
 Upon arriving at Mercer, officers of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
recommended that Cibula be treated as a sex offender, which under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 9718.1 required him to participate in a sex offender treatment program.  Cibula 
contends corrections officers made this determination without affording him any 
opportunity to contest his designation as a sex offender.
2
  While he was serving his 
sentence, Cibula alleges corrections officers disclosed his sex offender status to guards 
and inmates, which resulted in other inmates abusing and harassing him. 
 He also contends his sex offender status impacted his parole applications.  He 
petitioned for parole in July 2008, but the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Board of 
Probation and Parole denied his request because he had not completed the sex offender 
treatment program.  After this parole denial, Cibula attempted to participate in the 
program.  But corrections employee Stephen Laufer discharged him from the program 
because “[r]eview of [his] record indicates all charges of sexual offending [were] 
withdrawn by the state.”  Cibula v. Fox, No. 1:12-cv-2065, 2013 WL 3871637, at *1 
(M.D. Pa. July 25, 2013).  Despite this discharge, the Parole Board again denied Cibula 
parole in August 2009 for failure to complete the program. 
 In addition to denying Cibula parole in August 2009, the Parole Board issued an 
Administrative Action on February 3, 2010, stating: 
                                              
2
 Though not entirely clear from the record, the confusion over Cibula’s sex offender 
status appears to stem from the Commonwealth’s withdrawal of sex-related charges 
against him when he pled nolo contendere to the terroristic threat charges. 
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Based on the information provided to the Parole Board, you have not 
attended and participated in a Department of Corrections program of 
counseling or therapy designed for incarcerated sex offenders as required 
by 42 Pa. C.S.A. Section 9718.1(a).  Pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. Section 
9718.1(b), your offense requires that you participate in sex offender 
treatment in order to be eligible for parole.  Therefore, you will not be 
interviewed by the Parole Board for parole/reparole until notification is 
provided by the Department of Corrections that you have attended and 
participated in a Department of Corrections sex offender treatment 
program. 
Cibula, 2013 WL 3871637, at *2 (footnote omitted).  Cibula alleges the Parole Board, via 
this Administrative Action, classified him as a sex offender without a prior hearing.  
Based on the Administrative Action, he did not apply for parole in 2010 and 2011. 
 Without a petition from Cibula, the Parole Board granted him parole on May 11, 
2011.  He was released from prison on August 18, 2011.  Approximately fifteen months 
later, on October 15, 2012, Cibula brought a § 1983 suit against several board members 
and employees of the Parole Board (collectively, the “Parole Defendants”), alleging 
violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights and his Eighth 
Amendment right to protection against cruel and unusual punishment.  The District Court 
dismissed the complaint without prejudice for failure to sufficiently allege that the Parole 
Defendants were responsible for the due process and Eighth Amendment violations. 
 On March 28, 2013, Cibula filed an amended complaint, joining several 
corrections employees as defendants (collectively, the “Corrections Defendants”), 
withdrawing his substantive due process claim, and including additional factual 
allegations supporting his procedural due process and Eighth Amendment claims.  He 
now contends the Parole and Corrections Defendants violated his procedural due process 
rights by classifying him as a sex offender without a prior hearing, violated the Eighth 
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Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by subjecting him to abuse 
and harassment based on his purported sex offender status, and collectively conspired to 
violate these constitutional rights. 
 The District Court dismissed the amended complaint because Cibula’s claims were 
not filed within the two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in 
Pennsylvania.
3
  The District Court held the statutory period for his claims against the 
Corrections Defendants accrued upon his arrival at Mercer on December 28, 2007, when 
he was classified as a sex offender without any form of process.  And the claims against 
the Parole Defendants accrued when the Parole Board issued the Administrative Action 
on February 3, 2010.  Both of these incidents occurred over two years before Cibula filed 
his initial complaint against the Parole Defendants on October 15, 2012, and his amended 
complaint against both the Parole and Corrections Defendants on March 28, 2013. 
 The District Court also rejected Cibula’s contention that even if his claims accrued 
over two years before he filed suit, he can nonetheless bring them under the continuing 
violations doctrine.  Under this doctrine, “when a defendant’s conduct is part of a 
                                              
3
 The District Court addressed a number of other issues, but Cibula only appeals the 
dismissal on statute of limitations grounds.  Cibula contends “[a]ll other grounds asserted 
by the defendants [in support of their motion to dismiss] were either denied, or not 
addressed by the court.”  Appellant Br. 11.  This is not entirely accurate.  The District 
Court declined to address some issues, found in Cibula’s favor on others, and decided 
two issues against Cibula.  First, the court held the Parole Defendants enjoyed absolute 
immunity for adjudicative decisions, like parole denials.  Second, the court dismissed 
damage claims against the Corrections Defendants for actions taken in their official 
capacities on Eleventh Amendment grounds.  Cibula has waived the right to contest these 
issues on appeal because he did not raise them in his appellate brief.  See United States v. 
Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an appellant’s failure to 
identify or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on 
appeal.”). 
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continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing the continuing 
practice falls within the limitations period.”  Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 
(3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The District Court held 
this doctrine did not apply because neither the Parole nor Corrections Defendants took 
any actions during the limitations period that could be considered part of a continuing 
violation.  While the Corrections Defendants allegedly informed inmates of Cibula’s 
status during the limitations period, the District Court concluded the abuse and 
harassment he suffered as a result of these disclosures to be “merely the consequences of 
the original act of deeming [him] a sex offender in 2007.”  Cibula, 2013 WL 3871637, at 
*8.  The District Court also found that the original act of labeling Cibula a sex offender 
upon his arrival at Mercer was “sufficiently permanent” to trigger his duty to assert his 
due process rights.  Id.  Cibula timely appealed. 
II. 
 Cibula challenges the District Court’s dismissal of his § 1983 claims as barred by 
Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations.  He argues that even if his claims did not 
accrue within two years of filing suit, they are nonetheless actionable under the 
continuing violations doctrine.  We first address whether his claims were timely filed and 
then whether the continuing violations doctrine applies. 
A. 
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court's dismissal of a claim under 
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to comply with the statute of limitations.  In re Merck & Co., 
Inc. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 543 F.3d 150, 160 (3d Cir. 2008).   The statute of 
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limitations is an affirmative defense, which may be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if 
“the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been 
brought within the statute of limitations.”  Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (quoting Hanna v. U.S. Veterans’ Admin. Hosp., 514 F.2d 1092, 1094 (3d Cir. 
1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “If the bar is not apparent on the face of the 
complaint, then it may not afford the basis for a dismissal of the complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6).”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 For § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the statute of limitations governing 
personal injury actions in the state where the cause of action arose.  Garvin v. City of 
Philadelphia, 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003).  In Pennsylvania, the statute of 
limitations for personal injury claims is two years.  Id. (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 5524(7) (West Supp. 2003)).  “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues, and the 
statute of limitations begins to run, ‘when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the 
injury upon which its action is based.’”  Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998)).  “The 
determination of the time at which a claim accrues is an objective inquiry; we ask not 
what the plaintiff actually knew but what a reasonable person should have known.”  Id. 
(citing Barren v. United States, 839 F.2d 987, 990 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
 It is apparent from the face of the amended complaint that Cibula’s procedural due 
process claims against both the Corrections and Parole Defendants are time barred, as 
they accrued over two years before he filed suit on October 15, 2012.  His claim against 
the Corrections Defendants accrued on December 28, 2007 (nearly five years before he 
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filed his complaint), when he arrived at Mercer and was summarily labeled a sex offender 
without receiving any opportunity to contest the classification.  Given that Cibula 
received no process at all, a reasonable person would have known at this point that the 
Corrections Defendants violated his procedural due process rights.
4
 
 The accrual date of Cibula’s procedural due process claim against the Parole 
Defendants also falls outside of the two-year statutory period.  A reasonable person 
would have been aware that a due process violation occurred when the Parole Board 
issued the Administrative Action on February 3, 2010, over two-and-a-half years before 
Cibula filed suit.
5
  Without holding a prior hearing, the Parole Board stated: 
[Y]our offense requires that you participate in sex offender treatment in 
order to be eligible for parole.  Therefore, you will not be interviewed . . . 
for parole/reparole until notification is provided by the Department of 
Corrections that you have attended and participated in a . . . sex offender 
treatment program. 
Cibula, 2013 WL 3871637, at *2.  Based on this agency action, a reasonable person 
would have concluded that the Parole Defendants labeled Cibula a sex offender without 
providing any pre-classification process.  Accordingly, his due process claim against the 
Parole Defendants is time barred. 
 Cibula’s Eighth Amendment claim against the Corrections Defendants also 
                                              
4
 Inmates have a liberty interest in not being labeled sex offenders.  Renchenski v. 
Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 326 (3d Cir. 2010).  Thus, the government must provide process 
before making such classifications.  See id. (“We agree that only after a prisoner has been 
afforded due process may sex offender conditions be imposed on an inmate who has not 
been convicted of a sexual offense.”). 
5
 The accrual date could arguably have been even earlier.  When the Parole Defendants 
denied Cibula parole in July 2008 and August 2009 because he had not completed the sex 
offender treatment program, a reasonable person may well have concluded the Parole 
Board was classifying him as a sex offender without any pre-classification process. 
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accrued more than two years before he filed suit.  He contends the Eighth Amendment 
violation resulted when the Corrections Defendants disclosed his sex offender status to 
guards and inmates, which led to abuse and harassment by other inmates.  But both 
Cibula’s amended complaint and his appellate brief fail to provide specific facts 
regarding such disclosures and the resulting abuse and harassment, including the specific 
times when they occurred.
6
  Moreover, on appeal Cibula does not appear to advance any 
argument that the Corrections Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights within 
the two-year statute of limitations, relying instead on the continuing violations doctrine, 
an equitable exception to the statutory period.  Accordingly, Cibula’s Eighth Amendment 
claim against the Corrections Defendants is also time barred.   
B. 
 Cibula argues that even if his claims accrued over two years before he filed suit, 
these claims are actionable under the continuing violations doctrine.  Under this doctrine, 
a plaintiff can sue for actions that occurred outside the applicable limitations period if “a 
defendant’s conduct is part of a continuing practice [and] . . . the last act evidencing the 
continuing practice falls within the limitations period.”  Cowell, 263 F.3d at 292 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  But Cibula has failed to establish the doctrine 
applies here. 
 To determine whether a practice was continual, we consider (1) whether the 
violations are part of the same subject matter and (2) whether the violations occurred 
                                              
6
 Cibula’s allegation that he suffered abuse and harassment until his August 18, 2011, 
release from prison is insufficient to demonstrate that these acts occurred within the 
statute of limitations because he fails to plead any facts concerning these acts. 
10 
 
frequently.  See Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 165–67 (3d  Cir. 
2013).
7
  A plaintiff must also point to an affirmative act that took place within the 
limitations period for the continuing violations doctrine to apply.  See Cowell, 263 F.3d at 
293 (“The focus of the continuing violations doctrine is on affirmative acts of the 
defendants.”).8   
 For example, in Cowell, plaintiffs brought a substantive due process claim 
challenging the validity of liens fixed on their property.  Id.  They filed their claim after 
the statute of limitations had expired, but contended the existence of the allegedly illegal 
liens was an affirmative act that constituted a continuing violation of their due process 
rights.  Id.  We disagreed, holding the “mere existence of the liens does not amount to a 
continuing violation” and “the Township’s refusal to remove the lien [is not] an 
affirmative act of a continuing violation.”  Id.  We distinguished between “continual 
unlawful acts,” which can serve as the basis of a continuing violation, and “continual ill 
effects from an original violation,” which cannot.  Id. (quoting Ocean Acres Ltd. v. Dare 
                                              
7
 Cowell included a third factor—whether the violations had a degree of permanence that 
would have triggered the plaintiff’s awareness of the duty to assert his or her rights.  
Cowell, 263 F.3d at 292.  But we limited Cowell’s test for determining whether a 
continuing violation exists by eliminating the degree of permanence factor in light of 
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).  See Mandel, 706 
F.3d at 165–67. 
8
 Although Mandel did away with Cowell’s degree of permanence factor, it did not 
eliminate Cowell’s requirement of an affirmative act within the limitations period for 
application of the continuing violations doctrine.  Accordingly, although Cibula is correct 
that the District Court erred by relying in part on the degree of permanence factor in 
refusing to apply the continuing violations doctrine, we may nevertheless affirm because 
the court also relied on Cibula’s failure to adequately allege defendants committed an 
affirmative act within the limitations period.  See Cowell, 263 F.3d at 393; see also Christ 
the King Manor v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 321 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (noting we may affirm on any basis supported by the record).    
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Cnty. Bd. of Health, 707 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1983)). 
 As in Cowell, neither the Parole nor Corrections Defendants took any affirmative 
actions during the two-year period before Cibula filed suit that could be construed as part 
of a continuing violation of his procedural due process or Eighth Amendment rights.  The 
Parole Defendants granted him parole during that time, but that is not an unlawful action 
furthering Cibula’s constitutional claims.  Cibula argues the Corrections Defendants’ 
disclosure of his status as a sex offender during this time qualifies as an unlawful act 
because it led to abuse and harassment by other inmates.  But Cibula failed to plead when 
the disclosure to other inmates and the abuse and harassment occurred, so we cannot 
determine whether any of these acts happened within the statute of limitations.  See id. at 
292 (“In order to benefit from the [continuing violations] doctrine, a plaintiff must 
establish that the defendant's conduct is ‘more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic 
acts.’” (quoting West v. Phila. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 755 (3d Cir. 1995)).     
 Even assuming disclosure occurred within the limitations period, we agree with 
the District Court that the abuse and harassment Cibula allegedly suffered as a result of 
these disclosures is best viewed as “merely the consequences of the original act of 
deeming [him] a sex offender in 2007.”  See Cibula, 2013 WL 3871637, at *8; see also 
Cowell, 263 F.3d at 293 (noting that “continual ill effects from an original violation”—
unlike “continual unlawful acts”—cannot serve as the basis of a continuing violation).  
Accordingly, the continuing violations doctrine does not apply to Cibula’s claims.   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing 
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Cibula’s complaint. 
